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STATE ACTION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES-
JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN
EDISON CO.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.' the United States Supreme
Court effectively immunized public utilities from constitutional responsi-
bility by holding that the termination of electric service by a privately
owned, heavily regulated utility company is not action by the state within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 2 'Despite the existence of a
partial monopoly and approval by a state agency of the utility's termina-
tion procedure, no state action was found.8
The petitioner Jackson, a welfare recipient, was a utility customer of
Metropolitan Edison Co. in York, Pennsylvania. Her service was termi-
nated without notice because of allegedly delinquent payments. 'Filing
suit under the Civil Rights Act, 4 Ms. Jackson sued for damages and an
injunction ordering Metropolitan Edison to provide power to her residence
until she had been afforded notice, hearing, and an opportunity to pay
any delinquent amounts.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's petition for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, holding that the defendant did not act under color of
state law.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
1. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
2. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985 (1970) may still provide
methods for obtaining certain constitutional rights from utility companies. See also
note 116 infra.
3. 95 S. Ct. at 457. While not articulating the Evans v. Newton test, the Court
found that the conduct of Metropolitan Edison was not "so entwined with govern-
mental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character" as to bring the
company within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299 (1966).
4. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. 348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972). It is interesting to note that in relating
the procedural history, Justice Rehnquist states that the action was dismissed because
the termination "did not constitute state action." 95 S. Ct. at 452. This evidences
the generally accepted proposition that the adequacy of color of law is measured by
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firmed the order dismissing the complaint.6 They held there was no state
action since "the action of the company in terminating the service . . .
was taken pursuant to its own regulations and using its own personnel,
without entering onto the customer's private property, without utilizing any
state statute or regulations. .... -7
By granting certiorari in Jackson, the Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to clarify several problem areas in the law. These in-
clude: (1) the continued viability of the state action doctrine; (2) the
function of state action in connection with procedural due process; (3)
alternatives to the state action analysis for due process questions; and (4)
the significance of the monopolists' relation to both state action and proce-
dural due process. The Court failed to examine these issues. Instead,
it framed its conclusions in terms of state action standards developed in
the equal protection area. These standards were given novel interpreta-
tions which severely undercut existing state action frameworks. 8
This Comment will examine the use of traditional state action standards
and their application in Jackson as well as discuss whether such standards
are actually applicable in due process areas, particularly where the con-
cern lies with state-granted monopolies such as public utilities. It will also
suggest that the Court demands a greater degree of state involvement to
find state action for procedural due process purposes than it does when
racial discrimination is involved.
USE OF TRADITIONAL STATE ACTION STANDARDS
Perhaps because the state action doctrine is continually maligned as be-
ing ill-defined and indeterminate, it has never found itself wanting for
commentators. Still, its meaning is undetermined." Section one of the
state action standards. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)
which establishes the equivalency of the terms. But cf. Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d
7, 15 (Ist Cir. 1972) where the court, discussing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970) observes: "[B]oth Justice Harlan for the majority, at 171, (by im-
plication), and Justice Brennan, in dissent, at 210, indicated that at least in some
cases, 'under color of' law requires more than 'state action.'"
6. 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973).
7. Id. at 758.
8. 95 S. Ct. at 459 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 475 (1953) state action is explained by
Justice Frankfurter, one of the most precise jurists of all time, as a notion requiring
that "somewhere, somehow, to some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by offi-
cials panoplied with state power." See also HORAN, Law and Social Change: The
Dynamics of the "State Action" Doctrine, 17 J. PuB. L. 258, 260 (1968), where the
author describes what state action means today.
[It] is at best a matter ofconjecture; the reluctance of the Supreme Court to
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fourteenth amendment is a restrictive clause; 10 both on its face and
through interpretation it prohibits the government from indulging in public
discrimination or misdeeds violative of due process. When a state, through
an agent or official, deprives an individual of guaranteed rights, that indi-
vidual is clearly protected by the amendment.'1 Problems arise, however,
when an organization, other than the state, is involved in the deprivation
of protected rights. Whether there has been a violation of the fourteenth
amendment will depend on the type and form of state activity involved.
If the court determines that the state has significantly involved itself,
it decrees that state action exists and the question of the violation of consti-
tutional rights can be considered. 12 If, however, as in Jackson, the state's
involvement is less than sufficient, the entity is free to commit what would
otherwise constitute unconstitutional acts.
State action is a concept which has grown in different shapes and forms
since its beginning in the Civil Rights Cases.'3 Those decisions, which
have established that only state activity is limited by the fourteenth
amendment, have become the bedrock upon which the court has been
struggling. In its struggle, the Court has described the state action doc-
trine under four or five main rubrics, all of which stem from two basic
analyses: either (1) the private entity assumes powers or functions com-
parable to that of the state, or (2) -the government subtly or directly infil-
trates the private activity to a considerable extent.
A finding of state action resolves only the first part of a two-part inquiry
into the constitutionality of an action. It does not, per se, mandate a find-
ing that a given act violates the fourteenth amendment; it merely allows
for examination of that question.
A. The Public Function Theory
Public nature, public function, and functional equivalent are labels
given to the public function theory. Where such a title is appropriate,
the private activity becomes that of the state for fourteenth amendment
provide even an approximate operational definition of the term differs only
in degree from its general unwillingness to examine the state action problem
at all.
10. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "[N]or shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or properth, without due process of law. .. "
11. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945). Both were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart
of § 1983.
12. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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purposes. 'Exactly what makes an activity public is open to interpretation.
Usually no direct government action is involved. The theory is that in
some form the private entity has assumed the equivalent of government
powers because it possesses the authority to deprive a general segment of
the public of rights protected by the Constitution. 14
The first case to adopt this concept was Marsh v. Alabama,15 in which
a company-owned town refused to permit a Jehovah's Witness to distribute
literature on a street corner. The Court held that since the privately
owned town did not functionally differ from any other town, the private
managers could not stifle first amendment rights.'
The theory was subsequently reaffirmed in Terry v. Adams,' 7 the most
important of those cases now known as the "white primary" cases.' 8 A
private organization, the Jaybird Democratic Organization, had controlled
county politics through their own pre-primaries for sixty years and had
continually discriminated against blacks. Since the Jaybird primaries
had become an "integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elec-
tive process,"1" the Court reasoned that the position of the organization
was virtually indistinguishable from the powers which the state had.
Therefore, it was subject to the same limitations as the state.20
In Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,2 1 the Supreme
Court again dealt with a private entity which had assumed a public func-
tion. As in Marsh, first amendment freedoms were being protected. The
Court required a private shopping mall to allow picketing on its premises
because it was open to the public and had effectively taken the place of
,the town square.22  In Evans v. Newton,23 the Court refused 'to allow
14. Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 691 (1974).
15. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
16. Marsh is noted perpetually for the public function test. It is also important
because state action was found for first amendment purposes. This may have been
the first time state action was found outside of the area of racial discrimination.
17. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
18. Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled 321 U.S. 649;
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
19. 345 U.S. at 469.
20. Id. at 469-70.
21. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
22. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) where a new analysis
of this case was established. Picketers are allowed only where their action is directly
related to activities in the mall and no alternative area exists to effect their purposes.
The decision changed the emphasis of the analysis from the role of the place alone,
to the content of the speech and its connection with the place in which it was spoken.
1026 [Vol. 24:1023
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segregation of a privately owned park. The land for the park was granted
in a trust which required the park managers to use it exclusively for white
people. Finding a violation of the fourteenth amendment, despite an ab-
sence of direct governmental involvement, the Court stated, "conduct that
is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon state action."'24
These cases focus on the nature of the activity rather than on actual
intrusion of the state into private affairs. The chief characteristic of all
the public function cases is not only the traditional assocation of the ac-
tivity with the state, but also its performance of important services for the
benefit of the public.
B. Totality of Circumstances: Significant Involvement
1. Joint Participation
The focus of the second theory of state action is on the interrelation
between the state and the private actors rather than on the function per-
formed. This is known as "joint participation, ' 25 "sum of the indicia ,' 26
or the "symbiotic relation."'27  In these situations the court determines
whether "the sum of various indicia of state participation in an enterprise
or institution are [sic] a sufficient basis"' 28 for the finding of state action.
The classic case illustrating this theory is Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,29 in which the defendant Authority leased a building to the
Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant which refused to serve the plaintiff be-
cause of his race. In reversing the Supreme Court of Delaware's finding
that the Eagle was a private entity not subject to constitutional limita-
tions, the Supreme Court scrutinized the government's ownership of the
See also Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974)
where the court, following Lloyd, decided property interests outweighed first amend-
ment rights.
23. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
24. Id. at 299. But see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) where the Court
held the trust from which the park was created invalid, since the trust doctrine of
cy pres was inapplicable.
25. Note: Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Consumers: Power to the
People, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493, 508 (1973).
26. Note, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045
(1968).
27. R. TURKINGTON & J. SHAMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS, 585 (1974).
28. See Note, supra note 26, at 1057.
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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land on which the restaurant stood, and the government powers and func-
tions given to the Authority-lessor. It decided that these features, in the
aggregate, indicated "that degree of state participation and involvement in
discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to condemn. '30 Furthermore, the state "so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity .... -31
2. Endorsement, Encouragement and Support by the State
Reitman v. Mulkey, 32 which held unconstitutional article 1, section 26
of the California Constitution,3 3 built on the dicta of Burton which sug-
gested that where the prestige of the state is lent to an activity, such ac-
tivity becomes that of the state. Thus Reitman forbids private discrimina-
tion endorsed by the state through a constitutional amendment. 34
Where legislation converts private action into state action, sufficient in-
volvement has been found . In Hall v. Garson,35 the court said that where
a private individual acted pursuant to statutory authority, giving a land-
lord a lien on the tenant's property and allowing him to enter the tenant's
premises to obtain items, "the action taken, the entry into another's home
• . .was an act that possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics of
an act of the state."3 6
The cases resulting from the litigation under the repossession and dis-
position statutes, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9-503 and 9-504, evi-
dence the unsettled definition of state action.3 7  In Adams v. Southern
30. Id. at 724.
31. Id. at 725.
32. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
33. Article I, § 26 provides in part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline
to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.
The ratification of this amendment reversed existing state laws which prohibited dis-
crimination in the sale of residential real estate.
34. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
35. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 439. Cf. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) and Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Il. 1972).
37. An excellent article on the subject is Burke & Reber, State Action, Congres-
sional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46
S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (1973). Also consider Male v. Crossroads Assoc., 469 F.2d
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California First National Bank, 8 the court found state involvement in a
repossession case insufficient to invoke procedural due process rights. The
court held that codification of existing law involving prejudgment self-
help, where the state had no intent to authorize violation of the four-
teenth amendment, and which did not deal with racial discrimination, was
not sufficient state action.8 9
The comparison of Reitman with the repossession cases noted above
demonstrates the double standard subscribed to in Jackson. That is, when
the constitutional injury lies in the equal protection sphere, courts have
been eager to find the state involvement significant. Where due process
questions are raised, however, state action has not readily been found. 40
3. Government Control Theory
A final theory of state action is the government control theory. Li-
censing or regulation, 41 without any other state intrusion, would be insuf-
ficient state involvement to invoke any constitutional rights. 4 2 Usually,
however, regulation is accompanied by other forms of government control
such as state creation of a monopoly or state granted franchises.
The first significant case in the area of government control was Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak.43 This case concerned the broadcast of
radio programs in the public street-railway of the District of Columbia.
The Court, on finding a sufficient nexus between the government and the
transit system determined that there was federal action, without finding
a violation of first amendment rights. The decision emphasized the regu-
latory power exercised by the Public Utilities Commission, which had been
authorized by Congress, and which had explicitly approved the challenged
activities only after a lengthy investigation. It specifically disclaimed reli-
ance on the congressionally granted franchise and considered only the
616 (2d Cir. 1972) and Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974).
39. Accord, Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). Contra, Cockerel
v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
40. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Coleman
v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73
(2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974);
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
41. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
42. See Note, supra 14, at 684.
43. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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regulatory aspects of the case. 44  Pollak seemed to establish a means to
find governmental action where the agency specifically approved a utility's
challenged conduct.
Another form of regulation, and certainly of control, is the state's grant-
ing of monopoly power to a private entity. By this government granted
restrictive device, the grantee's powers are enormously enhanced. What
results is a closely woven amalgam of state and private business. 45  Be-
fore Jackson, some courts had used the state-awarded monopoly as a basis
for a finding of state action.46 The view that constitutional obligation
should attach where state-granted monopoly power exists follows pre-
cisely from the other theories of state action, specifically that of private
assumption of government powers.
In Moose Lodge v. Irvis,4 7 the Court specifically veered away from the
monopoly issue, stating that the factual situation "falls far short of con-
ferring upon club licencees a monopoly in the dispensing of liquor in any
given municipality ... .4
The two theories discussed, the public function theory and the totality
of circumstances theory, overlap at several points and are often used in
conjunction with each other. Nonetheless they are meant to serve as
guidelines in the discussion of state action.
PUBLIC UTILITIES AS STATE ACTORS
Several of the state action models described in the preceding section are
applicable to public utilities,4 9 even with the recent limitation on the public
44. Id. at 462.
45. See Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972) involving judicial recog-
nition of governmental obligations which accrue when the government places
monopoly status in private hands. Here, as a result of a city zoning ordinance, the
defendant owned the only mobile home park in the area. The Court held that
therefore the tenants' first amendment rights of association could not be infringed
by the owner. See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Railway Em-
ployes Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
46. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 164-65 (6th Cir.
1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1972),
vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Ed. Co., 350 F.
Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717,
722 (D. Kan. 1972). Contra, Martin v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116,
1118 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
47. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
48. Id. at 177.
49. The state action problem does not exist in all utility situations because the
utilities are part of the state or municipal government and are therefore state actors.
The only issue then is exclusively whether there is a property interest for due process
1030 [Vol. 24:1023
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function theory.5 0 The Marsh and Terry cases are still relevant where
a private firm obtains powers which the government alone holds. For ex-
ample, most state statutes governing public utilities allow eminent domain
rights and entry by employees onto private property. To the customer
of a public utility, it seems that the company holds many of the powers
of the government. Vehemently dissenting in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec-
tric Company,5' Judge Sprecher said:
Not only is the defendant electric company in this case "accessible to and
freely used by the public in general;" not only are its "predominant char-
acteristic and purpose ... municipal." Wisconsin citizens are actually
compelled to use its facilities .... It is difficult to imagine a more thor-
oughly state-integrated government-substitute than a public utility .... 52
Historically, it may be added that public utilities have always been con-
sidered public callings, a term used to include those occupations which pro-
vide goods or services used by the entire public. These public callings,
because of their potential for causing great harm, are regulated by the
state.
53
The joint participation theory is equally applicable to public utilities.
The standard criteria, enunciated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority,5 4 for determining the collusive action is whether, after analysing
all the facts, "the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
[can] be attributed its true significance." 55  This standard intentionally
allows for judicial discretion.
Before Jackson closed the issue, several lower courts had found state
action through the sum of extensive regulation, monopoly position and
other powers, and had demanded constitutional responsibility from the
companies.5 6 For example, -the Sixth Circuit stated, "Virtually every as-
pect of this Company's operations are subject to the dictates of state statute
or to the regulation of the Public Utility Commission."5 7
purposes. See Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Lamb v. Hamblin,
57 F.R.D. 58 (U.S. Dist. Minn. 1972) (both involving city water departments).
50. Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
51. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sprecher, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 665.
53. See Barnes, Government Regulation of Public Service Corporations, 3 MAitQ.
L. REv. 65 (1918); Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service
Companies, 11 COLuM. L. Rlv. 514 (1911); Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings
as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HAv. L. REv. 156 (1904).
54. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
55. Id. at 722.
56. See cases cited supra note 46.
57. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 164 (6th Cir. 1973).
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Despite the holding in Jackson, the following should be considered: (1)
public utilities are state sanctioned monopolies placed in an exclusive and
favored position by the state; (2) public utilities act in the public interest
by providing essential services; (3) public utilities are responsible to the
'Public Utilities Commission (or similarly named commission), an agent
of the state, which approves the utilities' policies. The Burton criteria,
it was thought, could not demand any more.
Another theory important to the finding of state action in the public
utility cases is the degree of government control and regulation. After
Moose Lodge's weaking of Pollak, it is clear that controls alone are insuf-
ficient for a finding of state action. In the public utility situation, how-
ever, there is much more. State franchise bars entry by any competitor
and monopolistic status leads to inequality of bargaining power. Both, ar-
guably result in more callous treatment of consumers.5 8
Jackson's PERVERSION OF STATE ACTION
'Prior to Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Supreme Court had
twice been offered the opportunity to resolve the precise issue:5 9 whether
the fourteenth amendment requires privately owned public utilities to
grant procedural due process rights to a customer before terminating ser-
vice. The matter was finally confronted in Jackson.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, reiterates the state-private
dichotomy established in the Civil Rights Cases.60 'He comments that the
finding of state action on the one hand and private action on the other
"frequently admits no easy answer.""' Yet shortly thereafter he makes
58. Ironically, public utilities have successfully exempted themselves from anti-
trust laws not on the basis of their monopoly status, but rather because of the degree
of state involvement in their activities which has made them state actors. See Gas
Light Co., v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 969 (1972), where the court said, "Defendants' conduct cannot be charac-
terized as individual action when we consider the state's intimate involvement with
the rate-making process." Washington Gas Light Co., v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) which held administrative silence, not affirmative
approval, was considered sufficient for state action. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), where an antitrust action was successful against a public
utility, does not overrule these cases. Rather, the same standard is applied with a
contrary finding; state action does not exist because the challenged conduct was not
subject to specific state regulation or authority, hence the utility could not claim the
state actor exemption established in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
59. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated
as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
60. 95 S. Ct. at 453.
61. Id.
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the statement that mere regulation alone cannot convert private into state
action, citing Moose Lodge.62  The decision in Moose Lodge, however,
was based not on regulation but merely on licensing;63 whereas in Jack-
son, licensing alone is not at issue, nor, in fact, is mere regulation. The in-
volvement emphasized here is a state-created monopoly which, in addition,
involves regulation and control.
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak64 was the first case in which com-
prehensive regulation was held sufficient for state action. Moose Lodge
apparently narrowed Pollak to the situation where the state specifically en-
courages the alleged unconstitutional activity. Although Jackson does not
overrule Pollak, its precedential value appears to be substantially weak-
ened by the facts of Jackson. The Court admits that "it may well be that
acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a govern-
mentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be state acts
than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteristics." 65 The Court
proceeds to re-emphasize and adopt the Moose Lodge test: "But the in-
quiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."60 The Court con-
cludes that the nexus is not sufficient.
Justice Rehnquist next considers and rejects the petitioner's argument
that state action is present because of the monopoly situation. He reasons
that either utility companies, often considered natural monopolies,0 7 never
obtained monopolistic insulation from the state, or if they do, that this fac-
tor is not conclusive for a finding of state action.
This reasoning is both inaccurate and irrelevant as well as an improper
62. Id.
63. Contra, Seidenberg v. McSoreleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) was an exception decided before Moose Lodge. The court accepted
the argument that state action could be based on licensing. Here, the granting of
a liquor license with its attendant regulations, resulted in requiring tavern service to
both sexes on an equal basis.
64. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Because this case arose in the District of Columbia,
it involved the fifth, not the fourteenth amendment. Although, as in Jackson, the
Public Utility Commission was involved, the degree of supervision by the state was
greater in Pollak.
65. 95 S. Ct. at 453.
66. Id.
67. Natural monopolies are those which have constantly increasing returns to
scale. That is, because of certain technological conditions, the marginal cost curves
decline in the vicinity of the industry demand curve. Natural monopolies are distin-
guished from other forms of monopoly which use collusion and suppression of compe-
tition to attain their position. See G. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 94-98 (1971), and
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 115-16 (9th ed. 1973).
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application of the public function theory of state action. While it is true
that a natural monopoly would not require a state franchise to insure its
position of insulation, it is unclear that public utilities are necessarily na-
tural monopolies. As Justice Marshall observes in his dissent:
[I]t is far from obvious that an electric company would not be subject to
competition if the market were unimpeded by governmental restrictions.
Certainly the "start-up" costs of initiating electric service are substantial, but
the rewards available in a relatively inelastic market might well be suffi-
cient under the right circumstances to attract competitive investment. In-
stead the State has chosen to forbid the high profit margins that might in-
vite private competition. .... 68
The majority assumption that utility competition would be perpetually
avoided in a free market situation is not necessarily accurate.69
More significant, however, is the fact that the distinction drawn is point-
less. Whether the monopoly is a result of technological necessities or state
forces, two factors are evident: (1) the ramifications of the monopoly
position are the same, and (2) the government is entangled in the busi-
ness of public utilities. Whatever the origins of the public utility, it cannot
be ignored that at the present time government regulation permeates all
aspects of utility function.70  To distinguish between types of monopolies
serves no purpose, because either through their creation or their function
they would be subject to the state action doctrine.
The Court next deals with the public function concept. The public
function arena has always been confusing since its standards are subject
to such fluctuation. 1 The criteria for public function has been limited
to those situations where a private entity assumed government power. 72
Now, in Jackson, the Court re-emphasizes the point that such situations
which acquire state action exist only if the powers were "traditionally ex-
clusively reserved to the State. ' 78
The Court's finding that such a situation did not exist seems to be er-
roneous. On one hand, many powers of the public utilities were in fact
those usually reserved exclusively to the state. For example, eminent do-
68. 95 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. LAw & ECON. 55 (1968).
70. 95 S. Ct. at 458 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
73. 95 S. Ct. at 454. The government has, of course, provided electric service
both through municipal agencies and government-owned enterprises like the Tennes-
see Valley Authority, so that the argument can be met on its own terms.
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main74 and entry onto private property75 are statutory determinations of
powers usually not granted to ordinary businesses. On the other hand,
while the election cases uniquely fall within traditional state powers, many
other public function cases do not.76
Nebbia v. New York, 77 quoted at length in the majority opinion, is al-
most entirely inapplicable. Nebbia signaled the close of the Lochner78 era
in which substantive due process had enjoyed its heyday striking down
economic regulation throughout the various states. A finding of state ac-
tion for a state created and a state infiltrated public utility is not com-
parable to the post-Lochner policy of deferring to the legislatures in eco-
nomic matters. Furthermore, Nebbia itself precisely distinguishes public
utilities from upstate dairy farmers declaring that "the dairy industry is
not, in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility."'79 The effect
of Nebbia, in part, was the finding that public utilities were so significantly
clothed with a public interest as to warrant regulation.8 0  The other post-
Lochner era cases would have been better chosen to explain the judicial
reach to such interest. 8 l
The Court also rejects the notion that the state in any way authorized
or approved the specific termination procedure.82 The need for authoriza-
tion or approval stems from Moose Lodge's redefinition of the Pollak
standards. Until Moose Lodge, pervasive regulation appeared sufficient
for a finding of state action. Affirmative encouragement was not a known
74. Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 66, § 1124 (Supp. 1975-76).
75. Petitioner's Brief at 25, citing Pa. Util. Comm'n Elec. Reg. Rule 14D.
76. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private park); Boman v. Birming-
ham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960) (transit system); Davis v. Weir, 328
F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (water service).
77. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
78. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79. 291U.S. at 531.
80. Plainly the activities of railroads, their charges and practices so nearly touch
the vital economic interests of society that the police power may be invoked to regu-
late their charges, and no additional formula of affection or clothing with a public
interest is needed to justify the regulation. And this is evidently true of all business
units supplying transportation, light, heat, power and water to communities, irrespec-
tive of how they obtain their powers. Id. at 534.
81. E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). Unlike Nebbia, these cases do not specifically exempt the utility company
situations.
82. Metropolitan Edisons Rule 15, "Cause for discontinuation of service," was
filed in a general tariff with the Pa. P.U.C., pursuant to notice requirements of 66
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, § 1142 (1959), because the general tariff included a rate in-
crease. The Rule had been a part of all earlier tariffs filed. Public hearings were
held on the rate increase with no mention of the shut-off provision.
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prerequisite. Jackson reaffirms Moose Lodge's narrowing of Pollak, and
further questions whether state action was present in Pollak. "It is not en-
tirely clear whether the Court alternatively held that Capital Transit's ac-
tion was action of the state for First Amendment purposes, or whether it
merely assumed, arguendo, that it was and went on to resolve the First
Amendment question adversely to the bus riders."'s 3 Pervasive state regu-
lation, it seems, is no longer a viable state action doctrine.84
Finally, the Court finds unpersuasive the plaintiff's argument that a
symbiotic relation exists between the utility company and the state. The
court lists Metropolitan Edison's private attributes, but seems to give no
more than a short acknowledgement to the extensive regulation by the
state. Since the threshold requirement of state action is not met, the Court
is not required to determine the second half of the due process inquiry
whether the plaintiff was deprived of a property interest. 85
Clearly Jackson tightens state action requirements. Apparently, Pollak
and its interpretation of state action is of no precedential value. The sum
of the indicia concept also seems to have fallen. 86 As Justice Douglas ob-
serves in dissent, "Though the Court pays lip-service to the need for asses-
sing the totality of the State's involvement in this enterprise, . . . its un-
derlying analysis is fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative. 8 7
The majority approach towards involvement of the state heralds a signif-
icant change in attitude. Although argument has long been had with the
elements necessary to the totality, the emphasis on the totality itself has
never been questioned. Justice Douglas emphasizes, "[ilt is the aggregate
[of all relevant factors] that is controlling. 88  Indeed, it always has
been so although the majority fails to implement this. The result is that
the earlier state action cases are limited to their peculiar facts so that their
precedential value is questionable.
Perhaps the most devastating implication of Jackson is its failure to al-
low for a different result where a different constitutional injury is asserted.
Under the Jackson holding, the immunity of public utilities from constitu-
tional responsibility seems absolute. However, Justice Rehnquist suggests
83. 95 S. Ct. at 456.
84. Because the cases cited in note 46 supra, were based both on the monopoly
factor and federal legislation the holdings probably have not been made invalid by
the decline of the regulation theory of state action.
85. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 94 S.
Ct. 1895 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
86. See Notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
87. 95 S. Ct. at 459.
88. Id. at 458.
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,that if facts had shown that government-like powers were responsible for
the constitutional violation, different results could occur.
Danger lies in the absolute denial of state action recognition. It means,
as Justice Marshall observes in his dissent, that utilities could discriminate
against blacks, women or welfare recipients with impunity. s9 Yet because
state action has almost always been found in equal protection cases, no
matter how small the state's involvement, this seems an unlikely result.
The implication is that the Court has tacitly adopted a sliding scale of
state action. That is, denial of due process is perceived as a lesser evil
than racial discrimination, and where a less severe constitutional right is
violated, a greater degree of state involvement appears to be required.
The Court's reasoning would have been more sound had ;they ad-
mitted that state involvement was present but that it was insufficient for
procedural due process purposes. In this way they could have avoided
the state action issue, while still resolving the case in favor of the utility.
It would have been a far more coherent rationale. The reasoning on these
lines would be consistent with the equal protection analysis long subscribed
to by the Court.90 The appropriate standard of review would be de-
termined by the established formulas of rational basis, fundamental inter-
ests, and suspect classes.
The Court declines to do this and serious consequences may result by
its failure to enumerate a ratio decidendi. The resultant vagueness makes
subsequent decisions unpredictable. One unintended result may be that
public utilities are granted far more constitutional freedom than the Court
desired.
THE PLACE OF STATE ACTION IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASES
A. Development of State Action in Equal Protection Area
Grounds for the unusual legal reasoning found in Jackson can only be
explained by the fact that the state action doctrine was born and bred of
equal protection challenges. The demand for a finding of state action in
procedural due process cases is relatively recent. 91 If the area was con-
fused in racial discrimination cases, where courts have had a hundred
years to define it, the difficulty in applying it to a new area is overwhelm-
ing.
89. Id. at 465.
90. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
91. See Note, supra note 14, at 691.
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The fourteenth amendment was intended to give "Congress the power
to insure that the care of the civil rights of the recently emancipated
Negroes would be firmly in the hands of the federal government. '92 Pro-
tection of blacks from the caprice of southern legislators bent on maintain-
ing discrimination was the goal sought to be enforced.
The equal protection clause was expected to be the primary vehicle giv-
ing form and substance to the fourteenth amendment. However, the judi-
cial creation of the state action concept arose as an unanticipated obstacle.
Challenges to legislation and customs through the equal protection
clause nonetheless abounded. After the Civil Rights Cases, the Court re-
affirmed the requirement of state involvement to obtain constitutional pro-
tection 93 and the trend has been increasingly accepted. 94 Many of these
early cases resolve the question with a finding of no state action.
After the first World War, however, reflecting a moderate degree of
changed racial attitudes, the Court began to scrutinize more carefully the
hidden involvements of the government. The "white primary" cases pro-
duced much of the litigation in this area. 95 In 1945, the Fourth Circuit
found that state action existed when a black woman was, on the basis of
her race, denied admission to a library training program. 96 'Ever since the
decision of Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948, the equal protection challenge has
generally been sustained whenever racial discrimination can be linked to
some degree of state involvement.97
92. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 346, 349 (1963).
See also Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (1974).
93. Cf. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) resulting from the murder
of civil rights workers Goodman, Schwerner and Chaney in Neshoba County, Missis-
sippi. The Court said, "To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused
be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint ac-
tivity with the State or its agents." Id. at 794. The case was brought under 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1964), the criminal counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
94. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127(1903); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S.
678 (1887); Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
95. See cases compiled at note 18 supra.
96. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
97. A notable exception is Moose Lodge. But the equal protection area has been
expanded to include discrimination resulting from administrative decision, Robinson
v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) and custom enforced by state or local governments
or governmental agents, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Jackson
v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974) presents an example of the extent to
which some courts will find state action in order to obviate racial discrimination.
Here the court held that tax exempt charitable foundations that were extensively reg-
ulated by the state came within the sphere of the fourteenth amendment prohibitions.
1038 [Vol. 24:1023
B. Due Process and State Action
In recent years, the Supreme Court has not determined the extent of
state involvement required to decide whether there is a denial of due proc-
ess. 98  Lower courts have thus been left on their own. Although it can
be generally stated that findings of no state action are more common in
the due process area than in the equal protection area, 99 the results have
nevertheless, presented inconsistencies. These inconsistencies appear to
be the result of the use of different criteria in determining state action in
due process cases as opposed to equal protection cases. Yet with the ex-
ception of a series of Second Circuit decisions by Judge Friendly 00 and
Judge Eschbach's decision in Bright v. Isenbarger'01 very few courts have
admitted to the possibility of more than one standard. This situation has
now been epitomized in Jackson, where no reference is made to the dis-
tinction between the two standards. Had Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
such a distinction, he could have eliminated some of the confusion by
simply requiring a higher degree of state involvement for a due process
challenge.
It is vital to note that had the court found state action, and proceeded
to find a property interest in life-sustaining electric service, 10 2 it would
have been the first time that due process was thrust on a supposedly pri-
vate entity. The desire not to establish such a precedent could well ex-
plain Jackson's outcome.
Some decisions, however, have made reference to a differing standard.
Supreme Court recognition appears most notable and possibly exclusively
in Adickes v. S. H. Kress. & Co.'0 3 The Second Circuit, however, in a
series of school disciplinary cases, distinguished the constitutional injury of
98. Interestingly, some of the first cases brought under the fourteenth amendment
involved due process. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)
(fourteenth amendment held inapplicable on the grounds that its purpose was to elim-
inate race discrimination, not economic discrimination).
99. See Note, supra note 26, at 1060.
100. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text infra.
101. 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), af 'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971),
where no state action was found which would limit parochial school expulsions, al-
though dicta left open the possibility of constitutional limitations were race discrimi-
nation at issue.
102. See Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 720 (D. Kan. 1972),
where the court notes that "unheated shelter affects life itself." Bronson v. Consoli-
dated Ed., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) where the court notes that "be-
yond doubt that electric service can become as vital to the existence and livelihood
of an individual as a driver's license or a welfare check. .. ."
103. 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, I., dissenting).
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procedural due process from racial discrimination, and considered the
former less serious.
The school cases began in 1968 with Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
University'0 and Powe v. Miles.'" Students in these cases were chal-
lenging disciplinary proceedings absent procedural rights. Both cases were
dismissed for want of state action. Judge Friendly's dictum in Powe is
significant, however. After determining that funds and scholarships did
not lead to significant state involvement he stated, "[w]hether this would
be true if Alfred [University] were to adopt discriminatory admissions
policies . ..is a different question we need not here decide."' 0  Con-
curring in Coleman v. Wagner College,'07 Judge Friendly decided that the
"state action line has here been crossed" 108 where school regulations on
demonstrations were in direct response to a legislative mandate. Three
years later he found insufficient state action to warrant due process protec-
tion when a student was dismissed from law school for failing to meet the
established academic standards.' 0 9  Still he reemphasized his point:
"[W]hile a grant or other index of state involvement may be impermissible
when it 'fosters or encourages' discrimination on the basis of race, the same
limited involvment may not rise to the level of 'state action' when the
tion in question is alleged to affront other constitutional [sic] rights."110
The public utility cases which failed to find state action do not suggest
that different tests were employed because a racial question was not in-
volved. Without exception, they held that any state involvement was in-
significant and the challenged action resulted from the company's own pri-
vate rules unsupported by the state."' It was this attitude which was
104. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (involving a student strike at Columbia
University).
105. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (involving anti-R.O.T.C. demonstrations at Al-
fred University).
106. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
107. 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
108. Id. at 1126 (Friendly, J., concurring).
109. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 1142. For a recent decision requiring due process in public schools,
see Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), where a class action was brought by an
Ohio high school student who was suspended for ten days without a procedural hear-
ing. The challenged regulation was held unconstitutional on due process grounds.
111. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (discon-
tinuation of service for non-payment of charges is not state action); Particular Clean-
ers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ed. Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1972) (requirement of
security deposit prior to commencement of service is not state action); Martin v.
Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1971) (employment discrimina-
tion on religious grounds was not state action); Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407
F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969) (termination of Call-Pak service was not state action).
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reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in Jackson. Ironically, just before
Jackson was decided, at least one federal district court believed sufficient
state action existed in public utility cases to invoke due process rights. 112
C. Policies Behind Due Process and Its Application to Monopolies
Due process is a right granted to any person to assure that certain pro-
cedures will be followed before the state deprives him of his property, his
freedom, or his life. Its purpose is to protect the individual from the
tyranny of the state.
If the courts relied on the policies underlying due process, more concrete
constitutional holdings would result. One commentator has suggested
that persons exercising peculiarly government functions which carry
"ominous potential in their misuse,"' act in the status of government and
should be treated as such for fourteenth amendment purposes.
A monopoly situation, by definition, is not an ordinary business com-
peting with numerous other firms. A state-governed, privately-owned,
public utility is a "state-bestowed, state-protected and state-regulated na-
But see Salisbury v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (1973) (dis-
continuation of telephone service did constitute state action).
112. Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Co., 378 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
A variety of other types of cases have dealt with due process state action questions.
A significant group has resulted from the Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9-503, 9-
504, the self-help provision for creditors where the debtor defaults on a contract.
Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir. 1974); James v. Phinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Bickel Optical Lab.,
Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973). All concurred with
Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974), finding no state action on similar self-help remedies.
Contra, Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (based on a Ken-
tucky garageman's sale statute, not the U.C.C.). In the area of landlord-tenant rela-
tions, see Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d
853 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (where state action was found for
federally funded, locally administered housing authorities); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d
1236 (4th Cir. 1973) (state action exists everywhere apartments are privately owned
if they are administered by the National Housing Act); Male v. Crossroads Asso-
ciates, 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.
1971). Receipt of federal Hill-Burton funds establishes state action requiring some
due process. See Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(hearing necessary only after suspension of doctor). Acquisition of federal construc-
tion subsidies and eminent domain powers required acceptance of black doctors and
patients as well as granting them equal protection under the laws. See Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1974) (state action inured where city welfare department placed children in private
institutions).
113. See Note, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 656, 704 (1974).
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tural monopoly to which every citizen is compelled to resort." 114  Due
process rights are necessary to maintain individual integrity in the face of
such power. If the state action model cannot deal with this situation, a
substitute must be found.
WHAT Is To BE DONE?
Jackson demonstrates what occurs when rigid doctrine is applied to a
situation requiring flexibility. The doctrine itself begins to lose validity.
For more than a decade writers have been forecasting and encouraging
the demise of state action." 5  Courts, however, have refused to abandon
it. If maintenance of the state action theory is sustained, new and careful
construction of the requirements should be enunciated. The degree of
state involvement and the nature of the constitutional injury must be con-
sidered. The amount of state entanglement with a private entity has al-
ways been considered in terms of the state action theories. The nature
of the harm, only recently expanded beyond racial discrimination, is also
slowly being recognized as a variable with which the court must deal.
Under the existing state-private dichotomy, three methods of analysis
are available to the courts in deciding fourteenth amendment cases. 116
The first is an independent state action test. That is, only the amount
of state involvement is weighed to determine its sufficiency. A decision
is arbitrarily made that if state involvement reaches a certain level, state
action will be found and constitutional violations considered. Here the
facts are analyzed to determine the degree of state involvement in the pri-
vate activity.
The Jackson court uses this approach by purportedly giving an in-depth
114. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Co., 466 F.2d 638, 663 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sprecher,
J., dissenting).
115. Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on
the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966). Some authors con-
tend that the question is really whether the particular state action is constitutional
under various federal constitutional restrictions. See Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208(19.57); Williams, supra note 92.
116. For the specific problem of public utilities, a solution already exists within
the established state action frameworks through the appropriate regulatory agency.
See Center for United Labor Action v. Consolidated Ed. Co., 376 F. Supp. 699(S.D.N.Y. 1974). If the aggrieved party attempts to obtain relief from the public
utility commission and is refused, there should be no state action problem. The com-
mission is a branch of the state itself and has denied the petitioner hearing rights
before terminating services or raising rates. State encouragement and enforcement
of its own regulations is indubitably action of the state for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. Whether a property interest exists would be the next matter of inquiry,
but at least the first hurdle could be passed. See Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light
Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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analysis to all the elements of state concern, summing them, and arriving
at a conclusion. With this formula, the constitutional injury is not con-
sidered. No harm is more pernicious than any other; nor, as Judge
Friendly believes, is one injury made more equal than the rest.117
The second method allows for a decision based only on the injury.
State involvement is ignored. The inquiry focuses on whether there was
a deprivation of property without due process or whether there was dis-
crimination on the basis of race. If the event has occurred, protections
inure. Despite the evident conflict with privacy rights, this possibility
should be considered, particularly in the area of discrimination.
The final method of state action analysis is what the courts have in fact
,been using without labeling it as such. That is, both the amount of state
involvement and the severity of the constitutional harm are considered.
A weighing process occurs. Is the harm such that given the degree of state
involvement, constitutional responsibility should result? A decision based
on a realistic analysis of both aspects of the problem should lead to well
reasoned decisions.
Applying this last method to Jackson, the degree of state involvement,
or lack thereof, is weighed against the need for procedural rights. Public
utilities are created, fostered, and protected by the state; regulation is ex-
tensive; quasi-governmental functions are served. The need for procedural
rights is essential when balanced against the size and power of the private
company.
The alternative is to put aside the state action fiction in favor of a more
realistic approach. The traditional doctrine focuses on technicalities,
rather than on "the real interests which compete for Constitutional recog-
nition." 118 The new inquiry focuses on the interests at stake which demand
or prohibit constitutional invasion into the allegedly private sphere. Pri-
vacy, established as a fundamental right,"" is the primary concern which
would prevent fourteenth amendments intrusions. A balancing of inter-
ests would not demand application of the constitutional limitations, but it
would require a weighing of the need for the protections with the strength
of the privacy right.
The essential question is whether a state can legally prefer the private
interest of the public utility, which has been legislatively selected, over the
117. A. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PENUMBRA 22 (1968).
118. Van AIstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1961).
119. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405,U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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concern for individual rights. The answer should be determined by the
scale of importance established for equal protection. Where no funda-
mental rights or suspect classifications are concerned, a reasonable basis
for the policy should be sufficient to sustain the statute or regulation.
Where, however, fundamental interests come into play, only a compelling
state interset should be able to override the entitlement to constitutional
protection.
The elimination of state action as a controlling concept does not eliminate
the role of the courts. Rather it broadens it. The issue must become one
of . . . accomodating the interests, not one in the nature of a formula which
is irrelevant to the interests involved. 120
This concept is not new to constitutional law. However, it offers a new
approach which would free the Court of the rigid standards to which they
are bound by the Civil Rights Cases and their progeny.
Were this approach followed, Jackson would have been resolved dif-
ferently. The prime concern of the Court would have been with the depri-
vation of access to the essential needs of light and heat. The threshold
question of state action would not foreclose such consideration. Rather,
the kind and degree of the deprivation would have to be analyzed.
A consumer has neither bargaining power, nor a grievance procedure,
and therefore the concern of the courts for the potection of the individual
should be great. Furthermore, the burden on the utility would be limited.
Hearing procedures would be infrequently demanded, and yet the threat
of such an event may act as an incentive to improve service. In addition,
hearings do not require the full procedural requirements of a courtroom.121
The formality of the hearing is variable, so long as due process is
granted.122
120. Williams, supra note 92, at 390. An analogous model which deals with con-
stitutional interests in the equal protection area is found in San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. The Supreme Court laid out the requirements for a nonjudicial hearing in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Prior to the hearing, the petitioner must
be presented with timely and adequate notice which includes the reason for the ac-
tion. The petitioner must also be allowed the following: the right to present argu-
ments, the right to counsel, access to written evidence and the right to cross-
examination. The hearing must be had before an impartial decision-maker who
makes a written statement giving the reasons for his or her decision with reference
to the evidence used.
122. In the district court opinion of Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 342
F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), the court observed "shockingly callous and imper-
sonal attitude" where the utility company made innumerable errors including termi-
nating service at a wrong address and shutting off gas after a bill was paid. Id. at
243. In Bronson v. Consolidated Ed. Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the
court described the fact situation as "an Orwellian nightmare of computer control."
Id. at 444.
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The privacy contention of the utilities cannot be ignored, but the intru-
sion into private workings of a company would be minimal. Perhaps the
duty to provide due process could be considered the necessary exchange
for their continued monopoly power.
Legislation is another possibility. In a closely structured situation such
as public utilities this could be very effective. Properly drafted statutes
could provide for a hearing with full confrontation of the evidence and
avoid the issue of whether public utilities or other monopolies will be held
to constitutional standards. If the goal is to protect the consumer from
abuse by the utility companies, legislation provides an easy answer.
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the implications that Jackson will have on
utility companies, the public, and legal analysts of the state action doc-
trines. Public utility companies are state-devised and state-regulated.
While any of the traditional state action doctrines were available to the
Court for a finding of significant state involvement in this particular case,
it rejected them all. Furthermore, it rejected them with an analysis that
contorts precedential cases and compounds ambiguity making the future
decisions in this area more uncertain and unpredictable.
More significantly, the Court failed -to distinguish between the criteria
it uses in establishing state action in those cases involving equal protection
on the one hand, and those involving denial of procedural due process on
the other.
If the Court's reasoning in Jackson is any indication of the future course
of the state action test, then we should seriously entertain alternative guar-
antees of fourteenth amendment rights. For the relatively simple cases
such as monopolies which perform essential services, legislation is a real
alternative. For the remainder of cases, a weighing of the constitutionally
significant interests involved, either within or without the state action limi-
tations is necessary. Almost a decade ago, the following was written:
In view of the Supreme Court's recently manifested reluctance to abandon
'state action' constitutional lawyers may discount the probability of a major
Fourteenth Amendment re-evaluation. But in a time when the wheel of
national sentiment has come full circle to the mood of 1866, the only
question about the state action curb is how long it will be before a Supreme
Court majority rights the wrongs of 1883.123
The question remains unanswered.
Melanie Vogl
123. See Silard, supra note 114, at 872.
